The latest study investigating the cost-benefit ratio of apprenticeship training for Swiss companies has shown that most apprentices offset the cost of their training during their apprenticeship on the basis of the productive contribution of the work they perform. Given this outcome, it is worth investigating why so many firms choose not to train apprentices. Maximum-likelihood selection models were used to estimate the net cost of training for firms without an apprenticeship programme. The models show, firstly, that non-training firms would incur significantly higher net cost during the apprenticeship period if they would switch to a training policy and, secondly, that this less favourable cost-benefit ratio is determined less by cost than by absence of benefit. For the apprenticeship system as such the results indicate that, as long as training regulations and the market situation permit a cost-effective training of apprentices, companies do not need specific labour market regulations or institutions to offer training posts. In this respect, the Swiss findings might be of interest for the ongoing German discussion about the expected repercussions of a more general labour market deregulation on the apprenticeship training system. JEL classification: J24, J31, J44.
INTRODUCTION
Considering the importance of vocational training for post-compulsory education and training (upper secondary level) in many countries, especially in Europe, there is a remarkable paucity of studies investigating the economic determinants of this form of education. At the same time, the cyclical imbalance in apprenticeship supply and demand, and the structural decline in apprenticeships identified in some countries, now make it more important than ever to conduct an in-depth analysis of the reasons why some firms train apprentices while others do not. It is hoped that the results on which this article is based will contribute to a better understanding of how the vocational training system works.
Studies investigating the factors determining a firm's willingness to train apprentices have always been based on the assumption that profit-based companies calculate the likely cost-benefit ratio of training an apprentice and, logically, offer an apprenticeship if the outcome is favourable and do not if the outcome is unfavourable. Past studies of this type lacked access to actual cost-benefit data on apprentice training. The only data on cost and benefits that these studies were able to incorporate were certain macro and meso data, so-called stylized facts, about the cost (net cost at a later date) of apprenticeship training found in German, Austrian and Swiss studies. These analyses therefore, in many cases, did not constitute a sound basis for drawing conclusions as to the real factors motivating the companies concerned and determining their decision.
The purpose of this paper is to present a closer investigation of companies' willingness to provide apprenticeships. A dataset will be used that has two significant benefits for a study with this kind of an objective. For one, it is a large, up-to-date and representative dataset of training firms and provides precise details of the cost and benefit of the apprenticeship system. For another, the study includes a parallel analysis of non-training companies, allowing, for the first time, a systematic comparison in one dataset of training and non-training companies in terms of the cost-benefit ratio of training apprentices.
The structure of the article is as follows: the next section provides a brief description of the Swiss vocational training system, which is broadly similar to the German model but presents some particularities. The subsequent section describes the database for this study. The empirical part presents a cost-benefit analysis for firms that train apprentices and then uses selection models to investigate the likely cost-benefit ratios of non-training companies if they were to switch to a training policy. The final section summarizes the results and comments on the implications of the results for the economy and for educational policy.
APPRENTICESHIP TRAINING IN SWITZERLAND -SOME STYLIZED FACTS
The apprenticeship system is the route chosen by most Swiss youngsters at the upper secondary level. Around 60 per cent of young people who complete their compulsory schooling choose to embark on what is called the dual education system; that is, a training programme combining vocational education at school with training in and work for a company. Almost half of the remaining 40 per cent of young people who complete compulsory education go on to attend grammar school (Gymnasium) to prepare them for university and a more academic career. The remainder ( just above 20 per cent) either opt for other entirely school-based forms of education or (less than 10 per cent of a cohort of 16-year-olds) pursue no form of postcompulsory education, ranking Switzerland ahead of other OECD countries in terms of the percentage of the over-16 population attending school. Although employers' organizations often issue salary recommendations for apprentices, the apprentices' salary is determined by the employing company and not regulated by law or on the base of multi-sectoral agreements ('Tarifvertrag') between trade union confederations and employers' confederations. Vocational training in a dual education programme usually lasts three to four years, and dropout rates are fairly low, around 5 per cent. A few professions (mostly in the retail sector) still permit an apprenticeship period of just two years. Apprentices graduate with a diploma recognized throughout Switzerland, attesting that the apprentice has a professional qualification. After, or during, an apprenticeship, a qualification called a 'Berufsmatur' ( professional baccalaureate) may be acquired that additionally entitles the apprentice to begin third-level studies at a university of applied sciences. The quality of the training provided in Switzerland, which combines school lessons (one to two days a week) with on-the-job training in a firm under the supervision of certified staff, is recognized internationally as meeting top standards. 1 International comparisons show that, in terms of scholastic and professional qualifications, Swiss apprentices are more than a match for their upper secondary-level peers attending school full-time.
The employment period ends automatically on completion of training. Any extension of the employment period (making the apprentice a fully fledged employee) must be negotiated in a separate contract. Switzerland differs in this respect from some other countries where apprentices are protected from dismissal for a period of time after completing their training. Mobility is fairly high among young people who complete their apprenticeship, with only 36 per cent still working at their original training site one year on (see Schweri et al., 2003) .
The quality of Swiss vocational training and (as the case may be) universities of applied sciences is evident from the fact that graduate apprentices usually have no problem finding a job (see, for instance, OECD, 1. Few descriptions of the Swiss vocational education system exist in English. For example, the international review of the vocational education literature by Ryan (1998) does not mention Switzerland. For a qualitative comparison of Swiss vocational education versus the UK, see Bierhoff and Prais (1997) .
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DATA
The data used here are from two surveys conducted in Swiss firms in 2001 by the Centre for Research in Economics of Education at the University of Berne and the Swiss Federal Statistical Office (see Schweri et al., 2003) . In the first survey, firms that trained apprentices in the year 2000 completed an extensive questionnaire investigating aspects related to the cost and benefit of training and eliciting information about the training site itself. Large sites with separate departments for dealing with staffing cost and training were given two copies of the questionnaire per site. 2 The questionnaire was largely identical to one conducted in parallel for Germany by the Federal Institute of Vocational Education, Bonn (see Beicht et al., 2004) . The German survey in turn was an update based on improvement and adaptation of existing German studies (see von Bardeleben et al., 1995) . The second survey was directed at firms that had not provided training in 2000. The questionnaire was identical to the one for firms providing training, except that the questions relating directly to the cost and benefit of training did not apply. 3 The dataset embraces 2,352 training firms and 2,230 non-training firms. Three hundred and fifty of the non-training firms that would not even in theory have been fit to provide training due to organizational reasons 4 were excluded from the sample. This loss of data was unavoidable due to the lack of any pool of company statistics on apprenticeship that might have been used for direct sampling. The actual sample was therefore taken from a pool of 40,000 firms from a prior screening procedure in which the firms were required to describe themselves as training or non-training. For the calculations, all non-private firms were excluded as they do not maximize profits as assumed in our model. The actually used sample is therefore composed of 3,632 firms of which 1,971 are training firms and 1,661 are nontraining firms. 5 The response rate of training firms was higher in this study 2. For companies training apprentices in a number of occupations, a particular occupation was specified. These companies were allowed to reply in respect of several occupations, but were required to fill out separate questionnaires for this purpose. Several large companies did so. Non-training firms stated which occupation they would be most likely to provide training for if they were to start an apprenticeship programme. Non-training firms unable to specify a particular occupation were assigned to the 'other occupations' category. 3. Sampling and computation of weightings for projections were performed by the Swiss Federal Statistical Office (see Renfer, 2002; Potterat, 2003) . All estimations in this article are weighted by sampling weights accounting for the stratified sampling. 4. For example, a geographical outpost of a company with no decision-making autonomy and unequipped to provide training on grounds of size. 5. Sample descriptives are given in the Appendix of this paper. and therefore the weighted share of training firms of the total of all firms amounts only to 29.14 per cent. Table 1 gives an overview of the sample means for the 2,352 training firms observed. A detailed description of the cost-benefit model used to calculate cost, benefit and net cost per apprentice can be found in Wolter and Schweri (2002) . The costs of an apprentice are composed primarily of the apprentice's wages, the trainers' wages, the material and other expenses (including infrastructure cost and recruiting cost of apprentices) involved in providing the training. The benefit derived by the training firm from apprenticeship training during the apprenticeship period results from the productive work performed by the apprentice when she or he is not being trained. This benefit is broken down into production activities that would otherwise be performed by unskilled workers and skilled workers. While we can assume in the first case that the apprentice's performance has the same value as that of an unskilled worker, for the second case the value of the apprentice's performance is compared with that of a fully trained skilled worker.
The total net cost means differ significantly from zero; that is, there is a net benefit associated with training an average apprentice. We find net benefits for two-thirds of the apprentices, so only one-third of apprenticeship relations end with costs that are not fully covered by benefits. In this case, the firms are obliged to retain at least some of the apprentices and recoup the uncovered cost.
SELECTION MODELS TO COMPARE NET COST OF TRAINING AND NON-TRAINING FIRMS
For policy recommendations, it is decisive to know whether training and non-training firms differ in their ( potential) net cost, which we would assume from economic intuition. Using the observed data, only the net cost of the training firms can be calculated. This was sufficient for the purpose of the descriptive cost-benefit analysis above (Table 1) , but now we are interested in the net cost of a randomly drawn firm in the population of all Swiss firms.
Owing to a potential sample selection problem, the results of the OLS estimators (see Table 2 ) may be biased for this purpose. The problem of the non-observable net cost of the non-training firms is treated according to standard selection models used in the literature (see Wooldridge, 2002) . We make the following parametric assumptions for our empirical investigation:
where NC j is the net cost of training per apprentice and NC r j denotes the amount of net cost that firm j is ready to bear. This amount may be positive if the firm receives additional benefit from training beyond the productive work of the apprentice during the apprenticeship. 6 x 1j is, in our case, a vector containing variables concerning firm size, industry, apprenticeship profession, number of skilled workers in the profession trained, region and ownership of the firm. The vector x 2j contains the same variables, but in addition a dummy variable that indicates whether the firm has difficulties in finding skilled workers on the labour market (exclusion restriction). 7 This variable does not influence the net cost of the apprenticeship training, but it is expected to have a significant impact on the firm's decision to train when the net cost of the apprenticeship training alone would be positive.
NC j is only observed if firm j trains, i.e. if NC j < NC r j , or
If we drop the subscript j, let y 1 ¼ NC and y 2 denote the binary training indicator, then the econometric model for a random draw from the population can be written as
6. These potential additional benefits include image effects, technological spill-overs that emerge through the apprentices' learning new methods in professional school, rents resulting from employing own ex-apprentices as skilled workers, etc. (see also Acemoglu and Pischke, 1998 , 1999a , 1999b . 7. Another candidate for the exclusion restriction is the fluctuation of skilled labour in the firm. We estimated a model using both variables in the selection equation and did not find sizeable changes in the results. The underlying identification assumption is valid if the fluctuation is caused by exogenous shocks. There exists, however, evidence that apprenticeship training results in lower fluctuation for the firm (see Euwals and Winkelmann, 2002) ; therefore, we decided not to include this variable in the presented model. 7.00 * , ** 5 and 1 per cent significance level, respectively. The reference site is a Swiss-owned company located in the German-speaking part of Switzerland, has fewer than ten employees and trains apprentices in the category 'other occupations' in the service sector. 
for non-training firms. If r 6 ¼ 0, then the expected value of the error term is E ejx 1 ; y 2 ¼ 1 ½ 6 ¼ 0, and the self-selection problem would lead to biased estimates in the standard regression framework. To solve the problem, a maximum-likelihood estimation procedure can be applied, where the loglikelihood function (see Wooldridge, 2002) is Table 2 shows that r differs significantly from zero. In other words, otherwise similar non-training firms would have significantly different net cost of training per apprentice than firms with apprenticeships currently in place. Table 3 illustrates this on the basis of predicted net cost of non-training firms, which is in the highly positive range, amounting to somewhat more than CHF 42,000, whereas the net cost for training firms is significantly negative. 8 The differences in the coefficients between the OLS and the MLE model show, on the one hand, that the coefficients in the OLS net cost regression are biased if only training firms were included in the analysis. The coefficients in the MLE model, on the other hand, underline the importance of net cost for the training decision. In the net cost regression of the MLE model, we find that a randomly selected firm that is foreign owned or has a low number of skilled workers in the category of the apprenticeship profession would have a significantly higher net cost of training, whereas considering training firms alone would not have generated a significantly higher net cost of training for those firms. This difference fits with the observation that those firms have a significantly lower probability of training.
Predictions based on observable characteristics of the firms (OLS regression) would have
resulted in net cost for the non-training firms that is negative (approximately CHF À 4,000) and not significantly different from the observable net cost of training firms. This illustrates that the decision of non-training firms not to train would not seem economically rational if we only took into consideration the firm characteristics that affect the net cost of training firms.
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The significantly higher (and positive) theoretical net cost of apprenticeships for currently non-training firms may be attributable both to higher gross cost and to lower benefit derived from the productive contribution of apprentices. The consequences in terms of educational policy would, of course, differ depending on the reason for the higher net cost. This question can be analysed using the same procedure as for estimating net cost. The selection model is identical to the one presented in Table 2 . Instead of net cost, the gross cost of training is estimated, followed by an estimation of the apprentices' contribution to the firms' production. The results are presented in Tables 4 and 5. In both, the gross cost and productive contributions differ significantly between training and non-training sites.
As expected, the likely cost of training is higher for non-training firms than for training firms. However, the difference (roughly more than CHF 20,000, Table 4 ) is fairly minor compared with the benefit differential of slightly less than CHF 45,000 (see Table 5 ).
The results in Tables 4 and 5 cannot legitimately be added up and compared with the data in Table 3 , as the addition of gross cost and benefit Vella, 1998) ; see equation (6). b The average across the entire sample is not the arithmetic mean of the two sub-samples; it is the weighted mean. c Bounds are calculated as the 95 per cent confidence interval of the predicted means for the full sample and the non-training firms. For the training firms, the confidence interval is calculated based on the observed net cost. for individual sites generates different individual net cost averages than the addition of the overall average gross cost and benefit. The estimates show that the source of the significantly higher net cost for non-training firms is primarily rooted in the much lower expected benefit. The firms in question might have little work for potential apprentices quite simply because of the particular workforce qualification structure. This explanation is supported by the observation (see Table 2 ) that the number of skilled workers (in the same profession as the apprenticeship) reduces the net cost of training significantly. 9 On the whole, the results underline the importance of apprentices' contribution to the firms' production as a factor in making it worth a company's while to offer apprenticeships, and thus as a crucial factor in determining a company's willingness to provide training. Evidence that the productive deployment of apprentices need not detract from the quality of the training provided is shown by the high level of qualification of Swiss apprentices compared with their peers in other countries, as mentioned above. The importance of productive benefits for the Swiss vocational education system is in contrast to other vocational training systems, some of which are focused to a much lesser degree on productivity benefits during the apprenticeship period. 10
DISCUSSION
Vocational training policy debate in recent years has centred on labour market regulation and institutions (see e.g. Acemoglu and Pischke, 1998, 9. In the separate models for cost and benefits (results not displayed here), the number of skilled workers is significant in both, reducing the cost on the one hand and augmenting the benefit on the other. 10. A French-German comparison by Fougère and Schwerdt (2002) disclosed for example that, except for mid-sized enterprises, apprentices did not make a meaningful contribution to a company's operating result. The motivation for companies to train apprentices was identified as being easier recruitment of future skilled workers, and the possibility of longer and more cost-effective screening of potential employees. Additionally, in Schweri et al. (2003, p. 84) it was shown that if one compares cost and benefits between Swiss and German enterprises, the training of an apprentice in Switzerland costs some 15 per cent more than in Germany but the productive contribution is about 150 per cent higher than the one in Germany.
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r Verein für Socialpolitik and Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2006 1999a , 1999b Harhoff and Kane, 1997; Winkelmann, 1997) . The data presented here should constitute a basis for shifting the focus to another aspect of vocational education, namely how training is organized and regulated within firms. Analysis of the Swiss vocational training system has shown that the training of apprentices in most cases pays for itself within the training period. As a result, firms that train apprentices are not dependent on a regulated labour market and low workforce mobility to make training worth their while. Under these general circumstances, training and non-training firms differ more in terms of the likely net cost of training during the apprenticeship period and less in terms of the labour market factors. The paper also shows that the major part of the difference in the net cost of training apprentices is due to a difference in the extent of benefit accruing from apprentices' productive contribution and is not attributable to differences in the cost of training. This insight helps to identify a weak point of the Swiss vocational training system, namely that many firms will provide training only if there is work to be performed that can usefully and productively be entrusted to apprentices. Technological progress, the associated changes in demand for professional qualifications as well as economic fluctuations all have a significant influence on the amount of work that can be performed by apprentices and a commensurate impact on the number of apprenticeships provided.
The results presented here are also of significance with respect to the ongoing educational policy debate. There have been repeated calls in the past to raise the number of apprenticeships on offer by stopping non-training companies from getting a free ride. This proposed solution would have all companies, training and non-training, contribute a certain amount of money to a fund for apprenticeship training. The sums from this fund would then be used to support all companies providing training. Training would thus become more profitable, and the willingness to provide training would be greater because training companies that lose a graduated apprentice to a rival company would not stand to lose as much as before. This policy instrument for taxing non-training companies was based on the assumption that companies could not offset the cost accrued within an apprenticeship period. As has been seen, this does not apply to the majority of training firms, at least in Switzerland. That is not to say that this instrument would be wholly absurd, as the data show that non-training companies probably do not provide training precisely because it would not be worth their while. The revenue from this kind of tax instrument might therefore help today's nontraining firms to 'break even' if they were to provide training. However, the data from our analysis of the cost-benefit ratio of training apprentices suggest that an incentive of this kind would make no sense for pedagogic reasons alone. This is because the lack of benefit for non-training firms must be interpreted as a sign that these companies have no suitable activities to assign to apprentices. It would be a different situation if the higher net cost had been due to a higher cost of training. The creation of more apprenticeships is and remains a difficult undertaking. We must come to terms with the fact that vocational training is a market-directed section of the educational system and as such exposed to free market forces. To date, these market forces have not been dysfunctional in terms of producing irrational or inefficient responses on the part of industry and the business community. As such, there can be little justification for further state intervention in the vocational education market.
Finally, if we look across borders, the upbeat message for the German debate on the future of vocational education from this analysis of the Swiss situation is: contrary to frequently expressed fears, 11 labour market deregulation 12 is not the death-knell for vocational training. Its viability would, however, presuppose that apprenticeship training is more cost-effective than is currently the case in Germany. More cost-effective does not mean having to accept a reduction in the quality of the training provided. What it does mean is that the participation of apprentices in the production process of the training firm must be thought through and implemented more systematically than has been the case. It would also require more room for manoeuvre for the firms to set the parameters of employing and training apprentices, like the apprentices' wages, more freely from general regulations, in order to be able to adapt in a more flexible way to market requirements. Contrary to the line of argument often used, we assume that the future of German-style vocational education does not inevitably depend on a regulated labour market but it is because of these labour market regulations that the German system so far does not optimize the cost-benefit ratio during apprenticeship training. 11. Beckmann (2002) concludes as follows: 'A continuing deregulation in terms of weakening the influence of unions or works councils would probably be at the expense of the firms' willingness to pay for general skill accumulation' ( p. 385). 12. Compared with Germany, the Swiss labour market is much more deregulated. The OECD Employment Outlook (1999, p. 57), for instance, contains indicators of the overall strictness of protection against dismissals, where Switzerland is ranked 5th and Germany 21st of 26 ranked OECD countries in the late 1990s (sorted from least strict to strictest).
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